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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Respondent and Appellee Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association (the 
"Association") agrees with the statement of jurisdiction contained in the brief filed by 
Petitioner and Appellant Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association, LLC ("Forest 
Meadow"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue No. 1: Whether Forest Meadow has standing to challenge the 1971 CC&Rs and 
the 1980 Lien Notice since it took title to Lot 105 A with both constructive and actual notice 
of these recorded instruments? 
Issue No. 2: Whether Forest Meadow has overcome the presumptions contained in 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4, i.e., that Deseret Diversified was an owner of the property that 
became Lot 105 A at the time the CC&Rs were recorded and duly executed by the same? 
Issue No. 3: Whether Utah has adopted the Doctrine of Uniformity as it relates to 
CC&Rs and whether, specifically, it applies to the 1971 CC&Rs? 
Issue No. 4: Whether the 1980 Lien Notice, which merely republishes prior 
encumbrances, is a wrongful lien as against a lot already burdened by such encumbrances? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because this matter is before the Court of Appeals on appeal from entry of Summary 
Judgment by the district court on each of the above issues presented, the Court of Appeals 
grants the district court's legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness. 
Arnold Industries, Inc. v. Love, 63 P.3d 721,725 (Utah 2002) (citations omitted). 
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PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Issue No. 1: SeeR. 00230-33. 
Issue No. 2: See R. 00233-37. 
Issue No. 3: See R. 00468-73. 
Issue No. 4: See 0077-88A; 00466-68. 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Issue No. 1: Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102 (2000); Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-2 (2000); 
Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000); 20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants §§ 
266-67 (1995); Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781 (Utah 2002); Arnold Industries, 
Inc., v. Love, 63 P.3d 721 (Utah 2002); 23 Am. Jur. 2D Deeds § 272 (2004). 
Issue No. 2: Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4 (2000); Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 
1994); Capital Assets Financial Services v. Maxwell, 994 P.2d 201 (Utah 
2000); TWN, Inc., v. Michel, 66 P.3d 1031 (Utah App. 2003); Flying Diamond 
Oil Corporation v. Newton Sheep Company, 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989). 
Issue No. 3: 20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants § 160 (1995). 
Issue No. 4: Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1, et seq. (2000). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Appellant Forest Meadow2 filed this expensive lawsuit in an effort to avoid an annual 
assessment of $175 by the Association authorized by thirty-year-old Covenants, Conditions 
1
 The Association does not agree with Forest Meadow's Statement of the Case, 
Appellant's Brief ("App. Br.") at 17-21, in part because Forest Meadow failed to separately 
set forth a statement of facts as required by Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 24(b)( 1), the Association sets forth its own Statement 
of the Case and Statement of Facts. 
2
 Forest Meadow, though confusingly denominated as an association of property 
owners, is the owner of a single lot in the Forest Meadow Plat D Subdivision. 
2 
and Restrictions for the Forest Meadow Subdivisions ("CC&Rs") recorded in Summit 
County in 1971 and 1973. Specifically, this appeal seeks to reverse the summary judgment 
entered by the Hon. Judge Bruce C. Lubeck effectively validating the CC&Rs recorded over 
thirty years ago in Summit County. (R. 0493-97). Forest Meadow, the owner of Lot 105 A 
in the Forest Meadow Subdivision, Plat D, recognizes that Deseret Diversified Development, 
recorded the CC&Rs in 1971 "to provide for a mandatory home owners' association with 
power to make assessments and impose liens" against a large tract of real property in Summit 
County, Utah. (R. 0023-26). Forest Meadow tries now to avoid its obligations despite the 
uncontroverted fact that it admittedly took title to Lot 105A, Plat D, Forest Meadow Ranch 
Subdivision ("Lot 105A") with both constructive and actual notice of the CC&Rs. (R. 
00167-68).3 
The Association operates as the homeowners' association for approximately 800 lots, 
homes and cabins in the Pine Meadow Ranch and Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivisions 
located north of Silver Creek Junction in Summit County. (R. 00245). Principal access to 
the Pine Meadow Ranch area is from Silver Creek Canyon between Silver Creek Junction 
and Wanship along Interstate 80, reached from Tollgate Canyon. The ranch area is to the 
north and west of Interstate 80. The lots in the Pine Meadow Rand and Forest Meadow 
3
 The Association respectfully suggest that the court may consider this a 
frivolous appeal under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure since Forest 
Meadow acquired title to its lot with actual notice of the CC&Rs and because the expensive 
approach Forest Meadow has taken in this litigation is wholly out of proportion to the amount 
of controversy at issue, i.e., a $175 annual assessment. 
3 
Ranch subdivisions are adjacent to each other and they share a common roadway, water 
system and homeowners' association. (R. 00244). 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Brent Jensen and his companies, including Deseret 
Diversified Development ("Deseret Diversified"), had acquired interests in and began 
development of a large parcel of real property that would become the Pine Meadow Ranch 
and Forest Meadow Ranch subdivisions. (R. 00244).4 In August 1972, Deseret Diversified 
and Security Title Company ("Security Title"), together as "owners," recorded a plat, Forest 
Meadow Ranch Plat D, subdividing what is now known, in part, as the Forest Meadow 
Ranch subdivision. (R. 00179). Prior to the recording of the subdivision plat, in July 1971, 
Deseret Diversified had recorded a set of CC&Rs which encumbered portions of the Forest 
Meadow Ranch area and, specifically, much of what would subsequently become the lot 
owned by Forest Meadow. (R. 00174-77). In August 1971, promptly upon discovering a 
typographical error in the property description in the CC&Rs, the CC&Rs were corrected and 
the CC&Rs re-recorded (the "1971 CC&Rs") in order to eliminate confusion. (R. 00475-78). 
Jensen and his companies were also developing the Pine Meadow Ranch subdivisions around 
this same time period and recorded various sets of CC&Rs for Pine Meadow as well. (R. 
00181-90). 
4
 See Leo M. Bertanole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211,212 (Utah 
1981) (noting a general description of the development area and Brent Jensen's 
involvement). 
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In May 1978, the Forest Meadow Ranch Landowners Association5, which had acted 
as the owners' association for the Forest Meadow Ranch subdivisions, merged with the 
Association. (R. 00244). In 1980, to confirm public notice of the various sets of CC&Rs 
recorded against various Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions, the Association 
republished those CC&Rs in the form of a "Notice of Lien" ("1980 Lien Notice"). (R. 
00247). The 1980 Lien Notice did not change or alter any of the referenced the CC&Rs 
(including the 1971 CC&Rs) but merely clarified the applicability of the CC&Rs to the 
various Forest Meadow and Pine Meadow areas that were, post-merger, served by the 
Association. (R. 00247). 
For many years, the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions were served by 
a Special Service District established by Summit County. During this time, the Association 
had continued to act on behalf of its members in the Forest Meadow Ranch and Pine 
Meadow Ranch areas. In 2003, the Association had an annual budget of approximately 
$140,000. (R. 00246). The source of this budget is the modest $175 annual assessment on 
the property owners in the area subject to various CC&Rs.6 The subdivision plats and the 
CC&Rs recorded against the 800 separate properties within the Association have been the 
5
 This Association should not in anyway be confused with the Appellant in this 
action. They are distinct unrelated entities. 
6
 While the CC&Rs vary somewhat throughout the subdivisions within the 
Association, the level of assessment is uniform for all lots. The Association began making 
direct assessments to its members when Summit County dissolved the Special Service 
District in 1999 and transferred many of its responsibilities to the Association. (R. 00246). 
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foundation of hundreds, if not thousands, of deeds and other conveyances over the years 
since their creation. (R. 00246). 
In December 1999, Forest Meadow acquired Lot 105 A of the Forest Meadow Ranch 
Subdivision Plat D ("Lot 105A"). (R. 000136). Forest Meadow took title of Lot 105A 
expressly "subject to easements, restrictions and right of way currently of record, and general 
property taxes for the year 1998 and thereafter." (R. 00206). Compellingly, Forest Meadow 
acknowledges that it took title of Lot 105 A with both constructive and actual notice of the 
1971 CC&Rs and the 1980 Lien Notice. (R. 00167). However, Forest Meadow has never 
paid its annual $175 assessment, despite voting at Association meetings and enjoying the 
roadway improvements and other benefits provided by the Association. 
Shortly after taking title in late December 1999, Forest Meadow filed a petition to 
nullify the 1980 Lien Notice as a wrongful lien pursuant to the Summary Procedures of 
Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1, et seq. (R. 0001-0007). Forest 
Meadow did not initially seek to invalidate the 1971 CC&Rs. Subsequently, after its effort 
under the Summary Procedures was rejected by the district court, Forest Meadow filed an 
amended Petition for Summary Relief to Nullify Wrongful Lien seeking an order from the 
district court that the 1980 Lien Notice was a "wrongful lien" and a declaration that the 1971 
CC&Rs were invalid. As a result, Forest Meadow argued, it should not be required to pay 
any assessments. (R. 0102-04). In late 2003, the parties filed cross motions for summary 
judgment urging the court to resolve these issues as a matter of law. (R. 00215-16; 217-19). 
6 
The district court listened to extensive argument and, in March 2004, issued its Ruling and 
Order denying Forest Meadow's motion for summary judgment and granting the 
Association's cross motion for summary judgment. (R. 00366-82).7 Not satisfied, Forest 
Meadow filed a "Second" motion for summary judgment that was also denied by the trial 
court. (R. 00490-92). 
In April 2003, the district court entered judgment in favor of the Association and 
against Forest Meadow. (R. 00493-97). The judgment decreed (1) that the 1971 CC&Rs 
were properly filed and properly encumber Lot 105 A; (2) that the burdens and benefits of the 
1971 CC&Rs run with the land and have done so for thirty years and, as a result, Forest 
Meadow's challenge to the 1971 CC&Rs is untimely; (3) that since Forest Meadow bought 
its lot with notice of the 1971 CC&Rs and acquired title subject to them, it would be 
inequitable for Forest Meadow not to comply with them; and (4) that the 1971 CC&Rs and 
the 1980 Lien Notice are not wrongful liens against Forest Meadow's property. (R. 00493-
97). Forest Meadow now appeals this judgment. 
7
 The court ruled consistently in a companion case Paul Howard Peters vs. Pine 
Meadow Ranch Home Association (also known as Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners 
Association and as Pine Meadow Ranch Association), the appeal of which is also pending 
in this court, Appellate Case No. 20040396-CA. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Parties 
1. The Association was established August 14, 1973, by Brent Jensen and 
Vincent B. Tolmann to act as the owners' association for the Pine Meadow Subdivisions 
located in Summit County, Utah. (R. 00244). 
2. Forest Meadow is a Utah limited liability company established in December 
1999 by Axel Grabowski. (R. 0160-61). Paul Howard Peters was the President and Chief 
Executive Officer of Forest Meadow at the time Forest Meadow filed this action. (R. 0009-
10). 
Chain of Ownership of Lot 105 A 
3. Forest Meadow is the beneficial owner of Lot 105 A, Plat D, Forest Meadow 
Subdivision, by a 1999 Quit Claim Deed from Axel Grabowski recorded by the Summit 
County Recorder's Office (R. 0134). 
4. Forest Meadow's chain of title for Lot 105 A runs as follows: 
a. Deed from F.E. Bates and Mae P. Bates to Security Title Company, 
dated October 14,1965, recorded October 18,1965 asentrynumber 101972, Book M3, Page 
188. (R. 0134) This deed conveys the larger tract of property out of which Lot 105 A was 
subsequently created. (R. 0135) 
b. Plat "D" for the Forest Meadow Ranch recorded by Deseret Diversified 
Development Inc., absent Jensen Company, and Security Title Co., trustee, as "owners" on 
8 
August 9, 1972, as entry number 116550. (R. 0135) Lot 105-D of the Forest Meadow 
Ranch was created by the recordation of this Plat. (R. 0135). 
c. Deed to Lot 105-D from Security Title Company to Jensen Investment 
(another Brent Jensen company) dated January 15,1975, recorded January 16,1975, as entry 
number 125699, book M63e, Page 432. (R. 0135). Jensen Investment took title expressly 
subject to "easements, restrictions, reservations and rights of way appearing of record or 
enforceable in law and equity and taxes for the year 1975 and thereafter." (R. 0192). 
d. Quitclaim Deed to the East Half of Lot 105-D from Jensen Investment 
Clifton Emmet Clark and Sharon M. Clark, dated January 16, 1975, recorded January 16, 
1975, as entry number 125700, Book 63, page 433. (R. 0135). 
e. Warranty Deed to the East Half of Lot 105-D from Jensen Investment 
to Clifton Emmet Clark and Sharon M. Clark dated January 16, 1975, recorded January 16, 
1975, as entry number 125701, Book M63 page 434. (R. 0135). 
f. Quit Claim Deed to the East Half of Lot 105-D from Clifton Emmet 
Clark and Sharon M. Clark to Jensen Investment dated July 16, 1975, recorded July 23, 
1975, as entry number 127540, Book M68, page 671. (R. 0135-36). 
g. Warranty deed to the portion of Lot 105-D (which now becomes Lot 
105A today) from Jensen Investment to Harold E. Waldhouse and Maylene C. Waldhouse, 
dated July 22,1975, recorded July 23,1975, as entry number 127541, Book M68, Page 672. 
(R.0136). 
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h. Warranty Deed to Lot 105A from Harold E. Waldhouse and Maylene 
C. Waldhouse to Shelley J. Oakason, reserving oil, gas, and mineral rights, dated December 
12, 1988, recorded December 13,1988, as entry number 301081, Book 503, Page 524. (R. 
0136). Oakason took the property expressly subject "to easements, restrictions, reservations. 
and rights of way appearing of record or enforceable in law and equity and taxes and/or 
assessments for the year 1989 and thereafter." (R. 00203, emphasis added). 
i. Warranty Deed to Lot 105A from Shelley J. Liftos who had acquired 
title as Shelley J. Oakason to Axel Grabowski dated October 15,1998, recorded October 29, 
1998, as entry number 00521339, Book 01196, Page 00147. (R. 0136). Here, again, 
Grabowski took title to the property "subject to easements, restrictions and right of way 
currently of record, and general property taxes for the year 1998 and thereafter." (R. 00205, 
emphasis added). 
j . Quitclaim Deed to Lot 105A from Axel Grabowski to a company he 
established, Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association, dated December 9,1999, 
recorded December 10,1999, as entry number 00554966, Book 01299, Pages 00445-00446. 
(R. 0136). Forest Meadow also acquired title to the property expressly "subject to easements, 
restrictions and right of way currently of record, and general property taxes for the year 1998 
and thereafter." (R. 00207-08, emphasis added). 
5. The recordation of the CC&Rs imports constructive notice of their contents. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-3-102, 574a-2 (2000). In addition, Forest Meadow had actual 
10 
notice of the plat and CC&Rs. (R. 00167). ("Before Petitioner [Forest Meadow] acquired 
Lot 105A-D, I was aware of the 1971 CC&R's [sic], the 1973 CC&R's [sic], and the 1980 
Notice of Lien I knew that Petitioner [Forest Meadow] would not acquire the Lot 105A-
D free and clear of the 1971 CC&Rs [sic] or the 1989 [sic] Notice of Lien....") (Affidavit 
of Paul Howard Peters, President and CEO of Forest Meadow). 
Formation of the Pine Meadow Ranch and Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivisions and 
Owners' Associations 
6. Brent Jensen and his companies, including Deseret Diversified were the 
developers of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions. (R. 00244). 
7. Over twenty years ago, the Utah Supreme Court received that Brent Jensen and 
his companies were the developers of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions. 
SeeLeoM. Bertanole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639P.2d211,212 (Utah 1981) (noting 
that in 1970 "Brent Jensen, a defendant, bought acreage north of Tollgate Canyon for 
development purposes . . . . By January 1, 1975, 380 mountain lots had been sold in areas 
served by Tollgate Road, including Jensen's Forest Meadow Ranch and Pine Meadow Ranch 
subdivisions"). 
8. OnMarch 18,1971, Deseret Diversified was incorporated in Utah. (R. 00294). 
9. The Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D ("Plat D"), which was recorded with the 
Summit County Recorder on August 9, 1972, plainly states that it was recorded by the 
"owners" of the property, Deseret Diversified and Security Title Company, Trustee. (R. 
00179). 
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10. Plat D was then signed by the beneficial owner, Deseret Diversified (by W. 
Brent Jensen, President, and Lee Ann Hunter, Secretary) and by Security Title Company as 
Trustee. (R. 0179). Each party's signature on the plat implicitly confirmed the ownership 
status of the other. 
11. Plat D confirms that it was "recorded and filed at the request of Deseret 
Diversified Development Corp." (R. 00179). 
12. The Owners' Declaration of "Plat D" indicates, in relevant part: 
"Know all men by these presents that we, the four undersigned 
owners of the above described tract of land, having caused the 
same to be subdivided into lots & streets hereafter to be known 
as: FOREST MEADOW RANCH, PLAT "D" do hereby declare 
for perpetual use of the public all parcels of land shown on this 
plat as intended for public use." 
(R. 0179). While no portion of the plat appears to have been intended for public (as opposed 
to community) use, this Declaration identifies the "owners" of the developed lands. Id. 
13. The Subdivider's Note, also contained on the recorded Plat D, also provides, 
"The recording of this plat shall not constitute a dedication of roads and streets or rights of 
way to public use. It is intended that all streets shown hereon shall remain the property of 
the subdivider, Deseret Diversified Development, Inc.- and shall be completely maintained 
by said owners." (R. 0179). Here, Deseret Diversified was identified as the subdivider of 
the land as well as an owner. Id. 
14. The Surveyor's Certificate on Plat D provides that "I, Lynn D. Gottfredsen, do 
hereby certify... that I have, by authority of the owners, subdivided the tract of land shown 
12 
on this plat & described below into lots & Streets (private roads), to be hereafter known as 
FOREST MEADOW RANCH, PLAT 'D.'" (R. 0179, emphasis added). 
15. The Forest Meadow Ranch Landowners Association was initially formed as 
the owners' association for the Forest Meadow subdivisions, including Plat D. (R. 00244). 
16. The Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions have always shared a 
common water and roadway system and, on May 30, 1978, the Forest Meadow Ranch 
Landowners Association was merged into the Pine Meadow Association by shareholder vote. 
(R. 00244). 
17. Since the merger in 1978, the Association has operated as the homeowners' 
association for all of the 800 plus lots, homes and cabins in the Pine Meadow and Forest 
Meadow subdivisions. (R. 00245). 
18. The various subdivision plats and the CC&Rs recorded against the properties 
within the Association boundaries have been the basis for foundation of hundreds, if not 
thousands, of deeds and other conveyances of the 800 lots over the past thirty years. (R. 
00245). 
19. Lot ownership has been the basis for membership in the Association, including 
assessments and notice of and the right to vote at the Association's annual meetings. (R. 
00245). 
20. Prior to the dissolution of the Special Service District for Summit County 
referred to below, the Association operated based on funds collected by that District. Since 
13 
dissolution of the District, the Association has assessed all lots on a uniform basis to pay for 
its operations. (R. 00245). 
21. One of the primary expenses and responsibilities of the Association is to own, 
maintain and insure the extensive road system in the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow 
Ranches areas for the benefit of all of the Association's members and their invitees. (R. 
00245). Access to lots within the Association's boundary, including Lot 105A, can only be 
had through the Association's roadways. 
22. The Association also owns, maintains, and insures a substantial amount of open 
space for the benefit of its members. (R. 00245). 
Creation and Dissolution of the Special Service District 
23. In October 1985, the Summit County Commission determined to establish the 
Pine Meadow Special Service District (the "SSD") for the provision of water service, the 
maintenance of roadways, and other services in the Pine Meadow areas for the benefit of the 
lot and home owners, including the owners of Lot 105 A. (R. 00245-46). 
24. The predecessor owners of Lot 105A paid taxes to and received benefits from 
the SSD. (R. 00246). 
25. The SSD was dissolved by vote of the Summit County Commission in the 
spring of 2000. (R. 00246). 
26. The commission, sitting as the governing board for the SSD, conveyed tracts 
of open space to the Association and executed a "Deed of Easement" conveying to the 
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Association, for the benefit and use of its members, and easement for the operation and 
maintenance of roads in the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions. (R. 00246). The 
water rights and delivery system owned by the SSD were conveyed to a separate company 
owned by all association members. 
Assessment of the Association's Members Pursuant to the CC&Rs 
27. On July 22, 1971, Deseret Diversified recorded a set of CC&Rs entitled 
"Reservations and Restrictive Covenants, Forest Meadow Ranch," dated July 8, 1971, as 
entry No. 113593, Book No. M32, Pages 251-254 in the office of the County Recorder of 
Summit County. (R. 0023-26). 
28. These CC&Rs were signed by Deseret Diversified Development, a Utah 
Corporation by W. Brent Jensen, its president. (R. 0023-26). They plainly recite that the 
CC&Rs are established by Deseret Diversified "the owner of the foregoing described 
premises . . . . " (emphasis added). 
29. On August 19, 1971, Deseret Diversified promptly re-recorded the original 
CC&Rs (the "1971 CC&Rs") as Entry No. 113788, Book No. M32, Pages 590-93 in the of 
the office of the County Recorder of Summit County, to correct an obvious but incorrect 
description of the property. (R. 00475-478). The re-recorded 1971 CC&Rs clearly corrected 
the legal description from "Township 1 South" to "Township 1 North." The original 
recording information is reflected along with the new recording information. The re-
recorded 1971 CC&Rs plainly declare Deseret Diversified was the owner of the land 
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described therein. Much of the property that later became the Forest Meadow Subdivision 
Plat D is contained in that description. (R. 00475-78). 
30. On September 28, 1973, Brent Jensen on behalf of Pine Meadow Ranch 
recorded a "Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions" by "Pine Meadow 
Ranch, Inc." (the "Pine Meadow CC&Rs") as Entry No. 120967, Book No. M50, Pages 521-
530. (R. 0000181-90). 
31. In furtherance of its activities, the Association has assessed its members for 
payment of its actions on their behalf since the dissolution of the SSD. (R. 00246). 
32. The Association has collected from its members, and spent for their benefit 
in the Pine Meadow area, hundreds of thousands of dollars. (R. 00246). 
33. In 2003, the Association had an annual budget of approximately $ 140,000. (R. 
00246). 
34. Should the Association lose its ability to assess all of its members to maintain 
the commonly owned property, maintain its extensive road system and fund its other 
activities, its purposes would be frustrated and it would be unable to secure access, maintain 
and insure its properties, or enforce its other restrictive covenants on behalf of its members. 
(R. 00246-47). 
35. To confirm public notice of the various sets of CC&Rs recorded against 
various Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions, the Association republished those 
CC&Rs in the form of the 1980 Lien Notice recorded on July 25,1980 as Entry No. 168800 
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in Book 163 at Page 152 of the records of the Summit County Recorder, and therein gave 
notice of an address at which confirmation of payments of any assessments could be 
obtained. (R. 00247). 
36. In response to questions raised in part as a result of this lawsuit, on April 3, 
2003, the Association recorded the Clarification of Notice of Lien as Entry No. 653634 in 
Book 1523 at Page 1809, confirming that the 1980 Lien Notice was intended merely to 
republish the existing CC&Rs and other encumbrances of record and did not to create any 
new charge or encumbrance on any property. (R. 00247). 
3 7. Forest Meadow took title of Lot 105 A with actual notice of the 1971 CC&Rs 
and the 1980 Lien Notice. (R. 00167-68). ("Before Petitioner [Forest Meadow] acquired 
Lot 105A-D, I was aware of the 1971 CC&R's [sic], the 1973 CC&R's [sic], and the 1980 
Notice of Lien — I knew that Petitioner [Forest Meadow] would not acquire the Lot 105A-
D free and clear of the 1971 CC&Rs [sic] or the 19809 [sic] Notice of Lien "). 
Procedural History 
38. On March 6, 2000, Forest Meadow filed a petition to nullify the 1980 Lien 
Notice as a wrongful lien pursuant to the Summary Procedures provided in Utah's Wrongful 
Lien Statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1, etseq. (R. 0001-07). 
39. On May 17, 2000, having been denied summary relief, Forest Meadow filed 
an amended Petition for Summary Relief to Nullify Wrongful Lien seeking an order from the 
district court declaring that the 1980 Lien Notice was a "wrongful lien" and a further 
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declaration that the 1971 CC&Rs and the 1973 Pine Meadow CC&Rs were void, thereby 
excusing Forest Meadow from paying any assessments. (R. 0102-04). Forest Meadow 
accurately alleges that the 1971 CC&Rs burdened its property located in Township 1 North, 
as confirmed by the corrected and re-recorded 1971 CC&Rs. (R. 0001-0007). Forest 
Meadow had no confusion about which lands were burdened by the re-recorded CC&Rs. 
40. On October 14,2003, Forest Meadow filed its motion for summary judgment. 
(R. 00215-16). 
41. On December 10, 2003, the Association filed its cross motion for summary 
judgment and its opposition to Forest Meadow's motion for summary judgment. (R. 00217-
m-
42. On March 22,2004, after extensive argument, the district court, the Hon. Judge 
Bruce C. Lubeck, District Court Judge, issued its Ruling and Order denying Forest 
Meadow's motion for summary judgment and granting the Association's cross motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 00366-82). 
43. On April 5, 2004, Forest Meadow filed a "Second" motion for summary 
judgment, (R. 0383-4), which was opposed by the Association on April 17,2004. (R. 0462-
78). 
44. On April 29,2004, Judge Lubeck issued his Ruling and Order denying Forest 
Meadow's Second motion for summary judgment. (R. 00490-92). 
45. On April 29, 2004, Judge Lubeck thereupon entered judgment that: 
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1. Deseret Diversified Development, a Utah corporation, an 
owner and subdivider of the land that includes the lot [105 A] 
now owned by [Forest Meadow], properly encumbered that lot 
and others in its development with the 1971 Reservation and 
Restrictive Covenants Forest Meadow Ranch [1971 CC&Rs]. 
2. The burdens and benefits of the 1971 CC&Rs run with 
the land and have done so for the past thirty years. [Forest 
Meadow's] challenge to the 1971 CC&Rs is untimely. 
3. [Forest Meadow] bought its lot with notice of the 1971 
CC&Rs and acquired its title subject to them. [Forest Meadow] 
enjoys the benefits of the CC&Rs and it would be inequitable 
for [Forest Meadow] not to comply with them. 
4. The 1971 CC&Rs, the 1980 [Lien Notice] and the 2003 
Clarification of Notice of Lien are not wrongful liens against 
[Forest Meadow's] property. 
5. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of [the Association] 
and against [Forest Meadow]. The Petition is dismissed, with 
prejudice, the parties to bear their own costs and attorney's fees. 
(R. 0493-97). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
By the language of its own deed, Forest Meadow took title to Lot 105 A subject to 
easements, restrictions and rights of way appearing of record. Forest Meadow did not have 
to rely on constructive notice of those restrictions, however, because it admits it had actual 
notice of the 1971 CC&Rs and the 1980 Lien Notice before it chose to take title. CC&Rs 
are in essence contracts established by a prior owner that encumber property for the burden 
and benefit of subsequent purchasers. Forest Meadow became a party to this contract at the 
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time it purchased Lot 105 A. As a matter of law, the CC&Rs cannot be considered adverse 
to Forest Meadow's interest in Lot 105 A since it acquired title expressly subject to and with 
actual knowledge of the 1971 CC&Rs. Invalidating the 1971 CC&Rs would overturn thirty 
years of the Association's authority and action on behalf of its members, and the Association 
would effectively lose its ability to assess its members to maintain the commonly owned 
property, maintain the road and water systems, and fund its other activities. If the CC&Rs 
are invalidated, the developer's purpose in establishing a community, and setting up an 
association to govern it, would be frustrated. 
Forest Meadow ignores both history and practicality, setting up a series of hyper-
technical challenges to over-turn these CC&Rs, which were properly filed and have since 
acquired decades of dignity. It has launched an expensive challenge in an effort to avoid 
minor, annual assessments. Forest Meadow argues, for example, that the 1971 CC&Rs are 
invalid because Deseret Diversified, in 1971, corrected a typographical error in the property 
description. Forest Meadow ignores the fact that the re-recorded CC&Rs contained the 
specific notations of the prior filing, and that the prior filing, mere weeks before, constituted 
the basis for the re-filing. The document is in writing and bears the signature of its owner. 
It complies with Utah's Statutes of Fraud. There is simply no law or rule in Utah that 
requires a recordable document to be re-executed to fix a scrivener's error, so long as it 
accurately sets forth the author's intent. Forest Meadow offered no indicia of fraud or 
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intervention by a third-party between the filing of the two instruments, and no evidence was 
offered to suggest that the re-recorded CC&Rs are not reflective of the author's intent. 
While Forest Meadow's arguments fail as a matter of law, equity also mandates that 
Forest Meadow cannot invalidate the CC&Rs and reverse thirty years of reliance on them by 
hundreds of property owners and the Association. Read correctly, Forest Meadow's effort 
to invalidate the 1971 CC&Rs elevates a number of technical arguments over their 
compelling and logical substance. The result it urges is inconsistent with the law and equity. 
Section 57-4a-4(l)(j) of the Utah Code provides a series of clear presumptions, 
including a presumption that "recitals and other statements of fact in a [recorded] document 
. . . are true." Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(l)(j) (2003 Supp.).8 The recorded Plats, CC&Rs 
and other contemporaneous documents filed in the 1970s both state that Deseret Diversified 
was a beneficial owner of the property that became Lot 105 A at the time the CC&Rs were 
filed and recorded. Forest Meadow ignores this argument and offered no evidence to 
overcome this presumption. As an owner of the property, Deseret Diversified was clearly 
authorized to record the 1971 CC&Rs.9 
8
 Section 57-4a-4 provides in relevant part: "(i) A recorded document creates the 
following presumptions regarding title to the real property affected:... 0) recitals and other 
statements of fact in a document, including without limitation recitals concerning mergers 
or name changes of organizations, are true." Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4 (2000). 
9
 The illogic of Forest Meadow's argument is also demonstrated by the fact that 
the same Deseret Diversified that recorded and corrected the CC&Rs also subdivided the lots 
and recorded the plat. If it lacked an interest sufficient to support the CC&Rs, it could not 
have created Lot 105A. In other words, if Forest Meadow proves that the CC&Rs are 
invalid, it also proves that Lot 105A was improperly subdivided. Forest Meadow would then 
lack standing to challenge the Association. 
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The doctrine of descriptio personae does not offer Forest Meadow any relief or 
invalidate the 1971 CC&Rs. This Court has noted that "the unexplained use of the word 
'trustee' on a real property deed does not, absent other circumstances suggest the creation 
or existence of a trust, create a trust or implicate only a trust interest." TWN, Inc., v. Michel, 
66 P.3d 1031,1034 (Utah App. 2003) (emphasis added). Thus, a party, like the Association 
"may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust was, in fact, intended." Id. Unlike the 
circumstances of that case, there are no competing claims of title, and the extrinsic evidence 
(including the joinder of Security Title in Plat D) clearly demonstrates that Security Title held 
the property in trust for the interests represented by Deseret Diversified. 
The 1971 CC&Rs are valid since Deseret Diversified was an owner of the property 
at the time the CC&Rs were filed. Deseret Diversified recorded the 1971 CC&Rs as the 
beneficial owner of the property. The requirements of privity are satisfied. Forest Meadow's 
successors in interest received title from Security Title as Trustee for Deseret Diversified. 
The CC&Rs clearly run with the land and Forest Meadow took title with actual notice of the 
CC&Rs. 
Forest Meadow also argues the "Utah doctrine of uniformity" but provides no 
authority for that proposition. Utah has never adopted it. Forest Meadow argues that if the 
doctrine of uniformity as described in Am. Jur. 2D applies, the CC&Rs violate this doctrine 
since they do not apply to all of the Forest Meadow Ranch property owners. However, 
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Forest Meadow misapplies the doctrine. In fact, their application is completely uniform to 
all those burdened by the 1971 CC&Rs. 
Finally, the 1980 Lien Notice is not a wrongful lien pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 38-9-1, et seq. (2000). Since Forest Meadow was not an owner of "real property" at the 
time the CC&Rs were recorded, it does not have standing to invalidate the lien. As noted, 
Forest Meadow took ownership expressly subject to the CC&Rs and the resulting lien. 
Moreover, the 1980 Lien Notice does not create any new obligation outside of the 1971 
CC&Rs. Equity requires that Forest Meadow, like its neighbors, ought to be bound by the 
CC&Rs as it had notice of them at the time it took title and has enjoyed the fruits of such 
restrictions. Therefore, the lien properly established by the CC&Rs and republished by the 
1980 Lien Notice is simply not a "wrongful lien." 
ARGUMENT 
I. FOREST MEADOW CANNOT ESCAPE THE 1971 CC&Rs SINCE IT TOOK 
TITLE TO LOT 105A WITH ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE 1971 CC&Rs AND 
THE 1980 LIEN NOTICE. 
It is undisputed that Forest Meadow took title to Lot 105A "[s]ubject to easements, 
restrictions and rights of way appearing of record. . . ." (R. 00207-08). It also remains 
undisputed that the 1971 CC&Rs and 1980 Lien Notice were recorded before Forest Meadow 
took title to its lot and that Forest Meadow had actual notice of their content before purchase. 
(R. 00167-68).10 Therefore, as a matter of law, the CC&Rs cannot be considered adverse to 
10
 The recordation of the CC&Rs imports constructive notice of their contents. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-3-102, 57-4a-2 (2000). 
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Forest Meadow's interest in Lot 105A since it acquired title expressly subject to the 1971 
CC&Rs and 1980 Lien Notice. Moreover, the conduct of the prior owners, confirms Forest 
Meadow's acceptance of and agreement to be bound to the 1971 CC&Rs and subsequent 
1980 Lien Notice. (R. 00245). 
CC&Rs act as a contract established by a prior owner that affects property and is 
construed under principles of contract law: 
Restrictive covenants that run with the land and encumber 
subdivision lots form a contract between subdivision property 
owners as a whole and individual lot owners; therefore, 
interpretation of the covenants is governed by the same rules of 
construction as those used to interpret contracts. 
Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 810-11 (Utah 2000) (citing 20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants 
§ 170 (1995)) (additional citations omitted) See also Holladay Duplex Management 
Company, L.L.C., v. Howells, 47 P.3d 104, 105-106 (Utah App. 2002) (noting deeds and 
restrictive covenants are interpreted in the same manner as contracts); Canyon Meadows 
Home Owners Association v. Wasatch County, 40 P.3d 1148,1151 (Utah App. 2001) (same). 
Therefore, Forest Meadow effectively became a party to that contract, i.e., the 1971 CC&Rs, 
when it acquired title to Lot 105A subject to the restrictions and covenants recorded at that 
time as indicated in the deed. (R. 00207-08). Forest Meadow cannot now complain about 
the contract, the 1971 CC&Rs, since it took title with actual knowledge of their terms. (R. 
00167-68). See 20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants §§ 266-67 (1995) ("[restrictive covenants are 
enforceable in equity against all those who take the estate with notice of them") (citations 
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omitted); Swenson, 998 P.2d at 813 ("[restrictive covenant are a common method of 
effectuating private residential developmental schemes [and] property owners who purchase 
land in such developments have a right to enforce such covenants against other owners who 
violate them"). 
It has long been the rule that equitable principles do not allow Forest Meadow to 
avoid covenants and restrictions of which it had notice at the time of taking title: 
Restrictive covenants are enforceable in equity against all 
those who take the estate with notice of them, although they 
may not be, strictly speaking, real covenants so as to run with 
the land or of a nature to create a technical qualification of the 
title conveyed by the deed. The question is not whether the 
covenant runs with the land, but whether a party will be 
permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the 
contract entered into by his or her vendor, where the purchase 
was made with notice of such covenant. The enforcement of 
restrictive covenants or equitable servitudes is based on the 
principle of notice; that is, a person taking title to land with 
notice of a restriction upon it will not, in equity and good 
conscience, be permitted to violate such restriction. 
* * * 
Constructive or actual notice of a restrictive covenant imposed 
in furtherance of a building or development scheme, on the 
part of one against whom enforcement is sought, is essential. 
Accordingly, restrictions on the use of land in a subdivision 
embraced by a general plan of development can be enforced 
against a subsequent purchaser who takes title to the land with 
notice of the restriction. 
* * * 
A purchaser with notice of restrictive covenants upon land is 
bound by such restrictions, although they are not such as in 
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strict legal contemplation run with the land. Thus, even 
though a covenant does not run with the land, it may be 
enforceable against a transferee of the covenantor who takes 
with knowledge of its terms under circumstances which would 
make it inequitable to permit avoidance of the restriction. 
Such a covenant is binding on a purchaser with notice not 
merely because such purchaser stands as an assignee of the 
party who made the agreement, but because he or she has 
taken the estate with notice of a valid agreement concerning 
it. The enforcement against a purchaser with notice rests 
upon the principle that it would be inequitable to permit such 
an owner, while enjoying the fruits of and claiming under the 
grant, part of the consideration for which was the benefit 
promised by the covenant, to destroy such benefit by violating 
the covenant. 
20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants §§ 266-67 (1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Forest Meadow admits that it had actual notice of the 1971 CC&Rs and the 1980 Lien 
Notice before it took title to Lot 105A. It therefore took title subject to these restrictions." 
Forest Meadow cannot now escape compliance with the 1971 CC&Rs and their republication 
in the 1980 Lien Notice. As a practical matter, the result of the 1971 CC&Rs being deemed 
invalid by this newcomer's challenge would effectively cost the Association its ability to 
assess its members to maintain the commonly owned property, maintain the road and water 
1
' The Association does not contest Forest Meadow's title to Lot 105 A. Nor does 
the Association argue that the "subject to" language of the deeds somehow conveyed an 
interest to Deseret Diversified at the time it recorded the 1971 CC&Rs. There are no 
competing claims of title herein. Forest Meadow took title to its lot recognizing that some 
other party "may have rights in the property' against which the grantor did not warrant title.'" 
Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781, 792 (Utah 2002) (quoting Johnson v. Peck, 63 P.2d 251, 254 
(Utah 1936)). Indeed, "[tjhe words 'subject t o ' . . . commonly associated with attempts by 
the grantors to give notice of encumbrances." Ault at 792 (quoting Hancock v. Planned Dev. 
Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 186 (Utah 1990)) (emphasis added). 
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systems, and fund its other activities (R. 00246-47). Such a decision would reverse a 30 year 
history of providing such services and would be disastrously inequitable. 
Moreover, Forest Meadow's argument that the 1971 CC&Rs are "invalid because they 
were not 'subscribed' by Deseret Diversified after the property description was changed," 
App. Br. at 22-25, is not persuasive nor does it relieve Forest Meadow from being bound by 
the 1971 CC&Rs of which it was on notice. As is clear from an examination of the 1971 
CC&Rs, the refiling of the 1971 CC&Rs was made to correct a typographical error and 
correct the property description (i.e., Township 1 North). (R. 00475-78). The re-filed 1971 
CC&Rs were obviously corrective of the prior CC&Rs that contained an incorrect and 
inapplicable township reference. To eliminate confusion, the 1971 CC&Rs were re-recorded 
showing both the original and subsequent book and page references as well as with the prior 
entry number and stamp. (R. 00475-78). Such correction was satisfactory for the Clerk of 
Summit County, as her signature on the subsequently filed CC&Rs appears next to the 
original recordation stamp. (R. 00475-78). The new description is presumed correct under 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4 (1)0), as set forth more fully infra. Forest Meadow offered no 
evidence to overcome that presumption. Indeed, Forest Meadow consistently understood and 
assumed that the 1971 CC&Rs applied to this property - they were the very focus of this 
petition and motion. Forest Meadow's effort to raise the re-recording was clearly an 
afterthought, raised only after it had lost on summary judgment. 
Forest Meadow also argues that the correction is invalid because it violates the Utah 
Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (2000). However, Forest Meadow offers no Utah 
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authority to support its argument that the document had to be re-executed in order for it to be 
effective. This was not a blank deed, nor was its import changed after it was signed. Rather, 
the clear import of the re-recording is that the owner recognized its typographical error, 
corrected it, and re-recorded the document to confirm that it applied to the property being 
developed. The document, as re-recorded, satisfied all the requirements of the statute of 
frauds and was properly accepted and filed by the Summit County Recorder. There is no 
requirement that the signature be the last thing attached to a document, so long as the whole 
reflects the author's intent. 
Forest Meadow cites the rule provided in Arnold Industries, Inc., v. Love, 63 P.3d 721, 
727-28 (Utah 2002), that states: "[A] mistake in the description of the land conveyed may be 
corrected by a subsequent deed executed by the same grantor for the purpose of correcting the 
description and confirming in the grantee the title to the land intended to have been described 
in the prior deed." Id. (citing 23 Am. Jur. 2D Deeds § 333 (1983)). While the 1971 CC&Rs 
are not a deed, Arnold does not stand for the proposition that a subsequent deed is the only 
way to correct a legal description. In addition, the cited Am. Jur. 2D section continues (in the 
2004 version), and is relevant to this determination: "[TJhe correction deed need not restate 
all material portions of the deed being corrected if such portions contain no errors." 23 Am. 
Jur. 2D Deeds § 272 (2004) (citing J.E. Golden v. C.E. Hayes, 277 So.2d 816, 817 (Fla. App. 
1973)) (emphasis added). The subsequently recorded CC&Rs meet the test set forth in 
Arnold Industries since they contained the township correction and bear the recorder's stamps 
on each page of the corrected and re-recorded 1971 CC&Rs. (R. 00475-78). They bear the 
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owner's signature and apply to the land he developed. Moreover, Arnold instructs the Courts 
to construe Deseret Diversified's action in re-recording the CC&Rs as its intention to correct 
the scrivener's error contained in the CC&Rs as originally filed. See Arnold, 63 P.3d at 728 
(noting "[w]e will not presume that the members intended to perform a useless act but will 
construe the deed to give effect to the parties' intentions" (citing 16A C.J.S. Deeds § 170 
(2001))). No other reasonable conclusion about the re-recording of the CC&Rs can be 
reached. 
In J.E. Golden, relied upon by the court in Arnold, the court was faced with a similar 
problem as is presented by the filing of the corrective 1971 CC&Rs. In that case, the court 
addressed the validity of a corrective deed to correct errors in a previous deed relating to oil 
and mineral rights. Id. The court's ruling is instructive: 
A deed containing an incorrect description or a misspelling of 
names may be corrected by a subsequent instrument clearly 
identified as a correction deed. Said deed need not restate all 
material portions of the deed being corrected if such portions 
contain no errors. . . . In the present case, the July 12, 1954 
correction deed clearly and unequivocally relates to and 
identifies the June 23, 1954 deed and both deeds are recorded. 
The correction deed of July 12th was placed on record before 
anyone else's rights intervened and both deeds were record 
notice to subsequent purchasers. Appellants, as well as all other 
subsequent grantees, had clear notice of appellee's reservation 
of oil and mineral rights by virtue of the direct reference in the 
July 12th correction deed to the June 23rd instrument it was 
correcting. Thus, appellants' points on appeal concerning 
reformation of deeds when the rights of subsequent bona fide 
purchasers for value have intervened and estoppel are without 
merit. 
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Id. at 817 (citations omitted). Here, the original CC&Rs contained an incorrect property 
description. (R. 0023-26). The corrected CC&Rs "clearly and unequivocally" relate to the 
prior CC&Rs, page by page as demonstrated by the clerk's stamps, filed mere days before 
(R. 00475-78). While not called a "corrective" instrument, it is obvious that the subsequent 
filing corrected entry 113593, as the correction was made to the originally filed CC&Rs with 
all of the clerk's stamps of the prior filing present on the corrective instrument. (R. 00475-
78). Like the parties in J.E. Golden, the corrected 1971 CC&Rs were promptly recorded 
before "anyone else's rights intervened" and certainly long before Forest Meadow took title. 
It remains undisputed that Forest Meadow took title with actual knowledge of the CC&Rs. 
(R. 00167-68). Here, there is no indication of fraud or otherwise; the incorrect property 
description was clearly a typographical error and was quickly corrected with the full 
knowledge of the Summit County clerk. See e.g., Sartain v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., 
775 P.2d 161, 164 (Idaho App. 1989) (noting "[wjhere there is no fraud and the rights of 
third persons have not intervened, and equity could have reformed the deed, it may be 
amended by a subsequent instrument so as to effectuate the intention of the parties") 
(citations omitted). 
In effect, Forest Meadow wants to invalidate the CC&Rs that have been adhered to 
by hundreds of property owners based on a contemporaneously corrected scrivener's error. 
Forest Meadow was not confused by the error - it understood and argued that the CC&Rs 
applied to its lot. Accordingly, equity does not allow for this result. See, e.g., Gonzales v. 
Gonzales, 867 P.2d 1220,1228 (N.M. App. 1993) (noting that equitable principles may apply 
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relating to a corrective deed based upon the parties' conduct). Forest Meadow's request to 
invalidate the 1971 CC&Rs is an extravagant and wasteful effort to lift form over substance. 
The result it seeks is inconsistent with the law and equity and should be rejected. 
II. FOREST MEADOW DID NOT OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION THAT 
DESERET DIVERSIFIED WAS THE OWNER AND DEVELOPER OF WHAT 
BECAME LOT 105A AT THE TIME THE 1971 CC&Rs WERE RECORDED. 
Utah law includes a specific statutory presumption among many that "recitals and 
other statements of fact in a [recorded] document... are true." Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-
4(1 )(j) (2000).n A recital by definition is "[a] preliminary statement in a contract or deed 
explaining the background of the transaction or showing the existence of particular facts." 
Black's Law Dictionary 1276 (7th ed. 1999). When recitals and other statements of fact are 
included in a recorded document, the presumption of their truth "may only be overcome by 
clear and convincing evidence." Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah App. 1994) 
(concerning the presumption in section 57-4a-4 (l)(j) that delivery of a deed occurred 
notwithstanding any lapse of time between the date on the document and the date of 
recording). 
Lot 105 A was created by the recorded plat map that established Plat D of the Forest 
Meadow Ranch subdivision. (R. 00135). Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D, which was recorded 
with the Summit County Recorder on May 6, 1976, clearly recites that the "owners" of the 
Despite being fully briefed at the district court level, Forest Meadow 
consistently ignores the application of this statutory provision and offers no evidence to 
overcome the presumption. 
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property were Deseret Diversified and Security Title. The Owners' Declaration indicates, 
in relevant part: 
Know all men by these presents that we, the four undersigned 
owners of the above described tract of land, having caused the 
same to be subdivided into lots & streets hereafter to be known 
as: FOREST MEADOW RANCH, PLAT "D" do hereby 
dedicate for perpetual use of the public all parcels of land shown 
on this plat as intended for public use. 
(R. 00135). The plat was then signed by Deseret Diversified (by W. Brent Jensen, President, 
and Lee Ann Hunter, Secretary) and by Security Title Company as Trustee, as owners. (R. 
00135). 
The Subdivider's Note, also contained on the recorded Plat D, provides additional 
evidence that Deseret Diversified was the beneficial owner of the property being subdivided. 
The note reads: 
The recording of this plat shall not constitute a dedication of the 
roads and streets or rights of way to public use. It is intended 
that all streets shown hereon shall remain the property of the 
subdivider, Deseret Diversified Development, Inc.—and shall 
be completely maintained by said owners. 
(R. 00135). The Surveyor's Certificate provides additional evidence and proof that Deseret 
Diversified was an owner at the time Plat D was recorded. This certification provides, in 
relevant part, "I, Lynn D. Gottfredsen, do hereby certify... that I have, by authority of the 
owners, subdivided the tract of land shown on this plat & described below into lots & streets 
(private roads), to hereafter known as FOREST Meadow RANCH, PLAT 'D.'" (R. 00135). 
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Security Title, as Trustee, by its signature clearly agreed with and ratified the recital of 
Deseret Diversified's ownership interest. 
Forest Meadow provided no evidence to rebut the presumption, pursuant to section 
57-4a-4(i)(j), that Security Title, held legal title as a "Trustee" on behalf of its principal. Plat 
D and the 1971 CC&Rs confirm that the principal, the beneficial title holder, was Deseret 
Diversified, the party that signed and recorded the 1971 CC&Rs. (R. 00135). Utah Law is 
clear to the effect that: 
There is a significant difference between the type of bare legal 
title possessed by an agent or trustee and the beneficial 
interest. . . . Agents and trustees have no direct beneficial 
interest in the property to which they hold title. Their title is 
held purely for the benefit of another. 
Capital Assets Financial Services v. Maxwell, 994 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah 2000).13 
The 1971 CC&Rs also recite that Deseret Diversified was the owner of "the South 
half of Section 22, Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, which 
will consist of all the lots of the Forest Meadow Ranch subdivisions within this area," (R. 
00475-78), a portion of which ultimately became Lot 105A. The 1971 CC&Rs were signed 
1
 Forest Meadow also argues that the 1971 CC&Rs are invalid under the Utah 
general law of trusts as "the beneficiary of a trust does not have the power to encumber 
specific properties held by the trustee in trust." Forest Meadow offers no legal authority 
from Utah to support its argument and ignores the law illustrated in Capital Assets, supra. 
Clearly, Security Title "purely" held title "for the benefit of another." 944 P.2d at 205. 
Forest Meadow's litany of hypotheticals, App. Br. at 38-43, ignores the reality that Deseret 
Diversified was the property owner and Security Title acted as trustee in holding the title for 
Deseret Diversified. None of the "parade of horribles" suggested by Forest Meadow is 
supported by a determination that Deseret Diversified, as an owner of the property, had the 
authority to record the CC&Rs or that the CC&Rs remain valid today. 
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by W. Brent Jensen, as President of Deseret Diversified. Id. By statutory presumption, this 
statement in the recorded 1971 CC&Rs establishes that Deseret Development had an 
ownership interest in the property at the time the 1997 CC&Rs were recorded. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(l)(j) (2000). No contrary evidence was offered. 
Yet additional evidence supports that fact that Deseret Development was the 
beneficial owner of the property at the time the CC&Rs were recorded. It has long been 
common knowledge and reputation in the Pine Meadow area that Brent Jensen and his 
companies, including Deseret Diversified, were the developers of Pine Meadow and Forest 
Meadow subdivisions. (R. 00244). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court described Jensen and 
his companies as the developers of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions. See 
Leo M. Bertanole, Inc. 639 P.2d at 212 (noting that in 1970 "Brent Jensen, a defendant, 
bought acreage north of Tollgate Canyon for development purposes By January 1,1975, 
380 mountain lots had been sold in areas served by Tollgate Road, including Jensen's Forest 
Meadow Ranch and Pine Meadow Ranch subdivisions"). Though the interest of Deseret 
Diversified in the property may not have appeared of record before the 1971 CC&Rs and Plat 
D the world was put on notice of its interest when those documents were recorded. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 57-3-102, 57-4a-2 (2000). And, all who acquired lots created by Deseret 
Diversified's Plat D took title to those lots by virtue of its actions as owner and subdivider. 
There is simply no evidence to overcome the presumption that the beneficial owner 
of the property that ultimately became Lot 105 A at the time the 1971 CC&Rs were recorded 
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was Deseret Diversified. Consistently, all indications and practical considerations confirm 
that it was and, acted as, an owner of the property. Accordingly, as owner, Deseret 
Diversified had full authority to burden its lands and record the 1971 CC&Rs to create 
constructive notice of their content. 
A. Forest Meadow's Assertion that Security Title Owned the Property that 
Became Lot 105A Outright Under the Doctrine of Descriptio Personae is 
Incorrect Because "Other Circumstances Suggesting the Creation or Existence 
of a Trust" are Present. 
Forest Meadow incorrectly asserts that the term "trustee" in the original Bates' deed 
to Security Title, (R. 00172), was merely descriptio personae and therefore insufficient to 
form a trust on behalf of Deseret Diversified. Therefore, Forest Meadow's argument 
follows, since no trust existed, Deseret Diversified did not have the authority necessary to 
record the 1971 CC&Rs since Security Title was the actual owner of the property. To the 
contrary, "agents and trustees have no direct beneficial interest in the property to which they 
hold title." Capital Assets, 994 P.2d at 205. 
Forest Meadow asserts that this case is similar to TWN, Inc., v. Michel, 66 P.3d 1031 
(Utah App. 2003). See App. Br. at 26. In TWN, the parties asserted competing claims to 
ownership of a parcel that was passed to one party's predecessor in interest by "Richard A. 
Christenson, Trustee" and the other parcel passed to the other party's predecessor in interest 
by "Richard A. Christenson." Id. at 1032. The issue in TWN was whether a grantor's 
unexplained placing of the word "trustee" next to his name on a real property deed results, 
as a matter of law, in conveyance of only a trust interest. The court noted that the doctrine 
35 
of descriptio personae applied when "certain terms [are] sometimes added to a person's 
name [that] are merely descriptive matter intended to clarify the identity of the person, but 
their use or non-use should generally play no part in the validity of the conveyance." Id. at 
1033. The concept of descriptio personae "has long been recognized" to apply "to the 
identification of parties on real property deeds. Id. at 1034 (citations omitted). Therefore, 
the court held, "[t]he unexplained use of the word 'trustee' on a real property deed does not, 
absent other circumstances suggesting the creation or existence of a trust, create a trust or 
implicate only a trust interest." Id (emphasis added). The court also noted that Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-7-402(5) authorizes a trustee to dispose of trust property "in the name of the trust 
as trustee." TWN at 1035 (citing U.C.A. § 75-7-402(5) (1993)). Typically, the court noted, 
"[a] trustee grantor should include on the deed such language as 'in my capacity as trustee 
for the XYZ trust' [but] a party may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust was, in 
fact, intended." Id. (emphasis added). 
Forest Meadow argues that "[t]he burden is on [the Association] to present sufficient 
extrinsic evidence that a reasonable person could conclude that a trust actually existed for the 
benefit of Deseret Diversified." App. Br. at 27. That is simply not the case. There are no 
competing claims to Lot 105 A. Forest Meadow owns it. Even if the Association has such 
a burden, however, the overwhelming extrinsic evidence, as the trial court correctly 
determined in its March 22,2004, Ruling and Order, shows that the beneficial owner of the 
property was Deseret Diversified and that Security Title acted as trustee for the owner: 
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Here, there is no competing title interests in property. There is no 
dispute that [Forest Meadow] is the record title holder to the 
property. It is undisputed that [Forest Meadow's] title traces back 
to Security Title. It is undisputed that Security Title's name is on 
the deed as trustee. However, here, other circumstances exists 
that did not exist in TWN. Specifically, the name of the trustee, 
Security Title, was one that would generally be seen as a trustee, 
not a property owner. A title company often holds title to property 
as trustee. Furthermore, the recorded plat map reflected Deseret 
[Diversified] as the owner of the property and Security Title as 
trustee. The recorded plat map clearly reflects Security Title as 
the trustee of the property and Deseret [Diversified] as owners of 
the property. Moreover, it is undisputed that Deseret had recorded 
CC&Rs with protective covenants and listed Desert as owner of 
the land. The court concludes that the word "trustee" under the 
circumstances surrounding this case reflected the existence of a 
trust and that Deseret [Diversified] was the beneficiary and owner 
of the property. 
(R. 00378-79). There is ample evidence to confirm that lands were held in trust for the 
benefit of interests that later devolved to Deseret Diversified. The word "trustee" as used 
in these instruments obviously did not describe Security Title; rather, it described and limited 
the interest held by that entity. See, Neeley v. Intercity Mgmt. Corp., 623 S.W.2d 942, 948 
(Tex.App. 1981) (cited in TWN and holding that a trust was created where there were 
multiple extraneous factors suggesting its creation, not simply the word "trustee" in the 
deed). Here, the doctrine of descriptio personae, as argued by Forest Meadow, is 
inapplicable. 
B. The 1971 CC&Rs are Valid Since Desert Diversified was in Privity with the 
Property that Became Lot 105A. 
Forest Meadow incorrectly argues that Deseret Diversified could not have recorded 
the 1971 CC&Rs because it had no estate in the property that became Lot 105A since 
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Security Title owned the land in fee simple. See App. Br. at 32. Security Title did not hold 
title in fee simple, however, and Deseret Diversified was clearly in privity of estate and could 
record CC&Rs relating to what would become Lot 105 A. 
Restrictive covenants, like the 1971 CC&Rs, that run with the land must have the 
following characteristics: "(1) the covenant must touch and concern the land; (2) the 
covenanting parties must intend the covenant to run with the land; and (3) there must be 
privity of estate." Flying Diamond Oil Corporation v. Newton Sheep Company, 776 P.2d 
618, 622-23 (Utah 1989). 
The first requirement requires that it "touch and concern the land." "For a covenant 
to run in equity, it must 'touch and concern' the land, and there must be an intent that it run. 
Privity is not required, but the successor must have notice of the covenant." Id. at 623, n. 6. 
The Flying Diamond further court notes: 
Not every covenant binds subsequent owners or users of the 
land, even though the covenant purports to be a covenant that 
runs with the land. The effect of the touch-and-concern 
requirement is to restrict the types of duties and liabilities that 
can burden future ownership of interests in the land. The touch-
and-concern requirement focuses on the nature of the burdens 
and benefits that a covenant creates. What is essential is that the 
burdens and benefits created must relate to the land and the 
ownership of an interest in it; the burdens and benefits created 
are not the personal duties or rights of the parties to a covenant 
that exist independently from the ownership of an interest in the 
land (citations omitted). 
* * * 
[T]o touch and concern the land, a covenant must bear upon the 
use and enjoyment of the land and be of the kind that the owner 
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of an estate or interest in land may make because of ownership 
right. 
Id. at 623-24 (citations omitted). The second characteristic requires that the parties intended 
the covenant to run with the land. The parities' intent may be determined by an express 
statement in the document or implied by the nature of the covenant itself. Id. at 627. The 
1971 CC&Rs expressly meet these requirements. 
The final characteristic is that of privity of estate. "Privity of estate requires a 
particular kind of relationship between the original covenantor and the covenantee." Id. at 
628 (citations omitted). There are three types of privity of estate: 
(1) mutual, i.e., a covenant arising from simultaneous interest in 
the same land; (2) horizontal, i.e., a covenant created in 
connection with a conveyance of an estate from one of the 
parties to another; and (3) vertical, i.e., the devolution of an 
estate burdened or benefitted by a covenant from an original 
covenanting party to a successor. 
* * * 
Mutual privity exists when the parties have a continuing and 
simultaneous interest in the same property (citations omitted). 
Horizontal privity exists when the original covenanting parties 
create a covenant in connection with a simultaneous conveyance 
of an estate (citations omitted). Vertical privity arises when the 
person presently claiming the benefit, or being subjected to the 
burden is a successor to the estate of the original person so 
benefitted or burdened. Vertical privity exists in all covenant 
situations except where a successor to the burdened or 
benefitted land is an adverse possessor or a disseisor. 
Id. (citations omitted). Flying Diamond declares that the "strict approach to privity doctrine 
[should be abandoned] and . . . substance should prevail over technical form so that a 
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homeowner's association which had no interest in the property at all could sue to enforce a 
covenant." Id. at 628, n. 13 (citations omitted). 
When the substance of the case is examined, it clearly appears that there was vertical 
privity of estate: here Security Title acted as Trustee for the interests that were ultimately held 
by Deseret Diversified. (R. 0135). Security Title, a business that, by statute and function held 
and transferred land titles, acquired this property in the states capacity of trustee for 
then-undisclosed interests. The beneficial interest of Deseret Diversified ultimately was 
reflected of record when it recorded the 1971 CC&Rs reciting its ownership of the property 
that subsequently became Lot 105A. (R. 0135). Security Title ratified and confirmed that 
interest when it executed the Plat with Deseret Diversified as "owners." Forest Meadow's 
successors-in-interest received title from Security Title as Trustee for Deseret Diversified. 
(R. 0135). 
The 1971 CC&Rs expressly state that "the reservations and restrictive covenants herein 
set out are to run with the land and shall be binding upon all persons owning or occupying any 
lot " (R. 00475-78). The neighboring Pine Meadow CC&Rs similarly expressly provided 
that "all of the properties . . . . shall be held, sold and conveyed subject to the following 
easements, restrictions, covenants, and conditions, which are for the purpose of protecting the 
value and desirability of, which shall run with, the real property." (R. 00181-90). Under 
Flying Diamond, the CC&Rs clearly run with the land and Forest Meadow is bound by them. 
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The chain of title is clear, and as the trial court ruled in its March 22,2004, Ruling and Order, 
Forest Meadow's "title is burdened by the prior recorded covenants." (R. 00379).I4 
Additionally, in order for Forest Meadow to prevail on its argument that Deseret 
Development lacks the privity requisite to record the 1971 CC&Rs, Forest Meadow must 
overcome the statutory presumption of ownership created by the content of these documents 
by clear and convincing evidence. See Jacobs, 875 P.2d at 561 (noting "the presumption [in 
section 57-4a-4] may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence"). Here, Forest 
Meadow has not attempted to provide any such evidence.15 
14
 The trial court held, "even if there was no vertical privity, as a matter of equity, 
the court agrees with [the Association] that prior predecessors in interest have treated the 
covenants as covenants that run with the land and so must [Forest Meadow]. A challenge 
to these covenants over thirty years later is untimely and must be barred." (R. 00380). 
Clearly, in Utah, a party must prevail in claims on the strength of his own title and not on the 
weakness of another. See, e.g., Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 87 P.3d 734, 790 (Utah 
App. 2004) (noting rule that "to succeed in an action to quiet title to real estate, a plaintiff 
must prevail on the strength of his own claim to title and not on the weakness of a 
defendant's title or even its total lack of title"); Collard v. Nagle Const., Inc., 57 P.3d 603, 
607 (Utah App. 2002) (same); Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch Corporation, Inc., 659 P.2d 
1045, 1048-49 (Utah 1983) (same). 
15
 Forest Meadow suggests that Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 
76 P.3d 711 (Utah App. 2003), cert, den., 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 2004), is supportive of its 
position. See App. Br. at 38. Forest Meadow's reliance on Dunlap is misplaced. The issue 
in Dunlap involved determining ownership between completing chains of title. Here, there 
is no dispute as to title regarding Lot 105A. The Association does not claim to be the owner 
of Lot 105 A through a competing chain of title nor does it contest that Forest Meadow is the 
rightful owner. Dunlap and similar cases focus on the problems created when documents 
affecting title are not recorded. Dunlap does not support the position that the content of a 
recorded document such as CC&Rs, recorded may be ignored, especially when the party has 
actual notice of the recorded document and its content. 
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III. UTAH HAS NOT ADOPTED THE DOCTRINE OF UNIFORMITY AND IT IS 
UNNECESSARY TO DO SO AS THE CC&Rs ARE UNIFORM IN THE 
RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED. 
Forest Meadow argues that the 1971 CC&Rs are unenforceable under the "Utah 
Doctrine of Uniformity" since they cover only a minority of the lots in Forest Meadow Ranch 
Plat D. See App. Br. at 43-44. 
Forest Meadow cites no authority at all for its argument that the Utah legislature or 
courts have adopted the doctrine of uniformity. Moreover, even assuming that the doctrine 
of uniformity applies, the CC&Rs are uniform as applied to each lot or home owner. Forest 
Meadow complains that the 1971 CC&Rs do not apply to all of the land owners in Plat D. 
There is no requirement that they do so. Under the doctrine of uniformity, as described by 
Forest Meadow, the CC&Rs must be uniform in their application to those land owners to 
whom the CC&Rs apply. See 20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants § 160 (1995) ("Restrictive covenants 
in deed will not be enforced at the instance of other property owners unless there is 
reasonable uniformity in the restrictions imposed....") (emphasis). That requirement is met 
here: the restrictions in the 1971 CC&Rs apply uniformly to all lands that are subject to them. 
On a broader scale, the uncontroverted evidence before the trial court shows that the 
Association's assessments are uniform throughout the various Pine Meadow and Forest 
Meadow Subdivisions. Accordingly, this technical argument also fails. 
IV. THE 1980 LIEN NOTICE IS NOT A WRONGFUL LIEN AS IT MERELY 
REPUBLISHED THE 1971 CC&Rs AND THE PINE MEADOW CC&Rs. 
Forest Meadow argues that the 1980 Lien Notice is a wrongful lien pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1, etseq. (2000). Section 3 8-9-1(6) of the Utah Code provides that a lien 
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is wrongful if it "purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain 
real property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not: . . . (c) signed by or authorized 
pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real property." Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-
1(6) (2000). As a threshold issue, Forest Meadow was not an "owner" of Lot 105 A at the 
time the 1980 Lien Notice was filed. (R. 00207-08). In fact, Forest Meadow did not become 
a record owner of Lot 105 A for nearly two decades after the 1980 Lien Notice was recorded. 
(R. 0136). Therefore, Forest Meadow did not have "an owner's interest in certain real 
property" "at the time [the 1980 Lien Notice] [was] recorded." By the unambiguous terms 
and clear meaning of the statute, it is untimely and inappropriate for Forest Meadow, over 
twenty years later, to consume the lesources of the Association and the court complaining of 
the lien and seeking declaration that the lien is "wrongful." It has no such standing. The 
predecessors in title to Lot 105 A, who had title in 1980, may have had standing to petition the 
court for removal of the lien as wrongful, but no application was made. 
It would be decidedly inequitable, and contrary to the purpose of the Wrongful Lien 
Statute, to allow Forest Meadow to look backwards and challenge an encumbrance created 
decades before it took title with notice of the encumbrance. Again, Forest Meadow took title 
with actual notice of both of the 1971 CC&Rs and the 1980 Lien Notice. (R. 00167-68). It 
made the knowing choice to buy the lot burdened by those encumbrances and cannot now 
complain about them. In addition, the 1980 Lien Notice, both by its terms and as clarified by 
the 2003 clarification of notice of lien, does not create any new obligation and cannot be 
considered a wrongful lien. Rather, the 1980 Lien Notice merely restates and republishes the 
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obligations established and placed of record by various CC&Rs as they apply to the lots and 
subdivisions described therein. 
Moreover, the question of whether the 1980 Lien Notice goes beyond the reach of the 
1971 CC&Rs with regard to Lot 105A is not ripe for determination. The Association has 
never attempted to collect assessments from Forest Meadow by lien foreclosure. (R. 00469). 
Yet, Forest Meadow and its predecessors-in-interest have enjoyed all benefits of the 
Association membership, including use of open space, roads and road maintenance, and 
voting rights. The trial court's Ruling and Order, dated March 22,2004, reiterates this point: 
[WJhere [Forest Meadow] bought the land with notice it did so 
subject to certain restrictions, [Forest Meadow] ought to be 
bound by those restrictions. Prior to subdividing the property 
Deseret [Diversified] recorded the plats and CC&Rs. The initial 
transfer from Security Title was granted in 1975. This was 
several years after the plats and CC&Rs were recorded. [Forest 
Meadow's] predecessors in interest paid the assessments and 
enjoyed the roads and open spaces as a result thereof. [Forest 
Meadow] has also had the right to enjoy the roads and open 
spaces. There is no dispute that [Forest Meadow] had notice of 
the restrictions at the time it received the property. Moreover, 
[Forest Meadow] took the property "[s]ubject to easements, 
restrictions and rights of way appearing of record. . . ." For 
[Forest Meadow] now to claim that those restrictions should not 
apply to it is not persuasive. The restrictions were recorded long 
before [Forest Meadow] obtained title. It would be inequitable 
to permit [Forest Meadow], while enjoying the fruits of such 
restrictions, to not comply with the restrictions when [Forest 
Meadow] had notice of them at the time it obtained title. 
(R. 00380-81). By virtue of the plain language of the statute, and also based on principles 
of equity, the 1980 Lien Notice was not and is not wrongful. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in this Brief, the Judgment entered by the Court on behalf of 
the Association is amply supported in law and in equity. This Court should, therefore, reject 
Forest Meadow's technical arguments and affirm the District Court's judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of October 2004. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
hJ<//b^~, 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Walter A. Romney, Jr. 
Attorneys for Respondent /Appellee 
Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association 
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UT ST § 57-3-102 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-3-102 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 3. RECORDING OF DOCUMENTS 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Copyright • 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
57-3-102 Record imparts notice --Change in interest rate --Validity of document --Notice 
of unnamed interests --Conveyance by grantee [Effective until July 1, 2001] . 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner prescribed by 
this title, each original document or certified copy of a document complying with Section 
57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a notice of location complying with 
Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement complying with Section 70A-9-402, whether or 
not acknowledged shall, from the time of recording with the appropriate county recorder, 
impart notice to all persons of their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest rate in 
accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying secured obligation 
does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the document provided under Subsection 
(1) . 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to the parties 
to the document and all other persons who have notice of the document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration, names the 
grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without naming beneficiaries or 
stating the terms of the trust does not charge any third person with notice of any 
interest of the grantor or of the interest of any other person not named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to him free and 
clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he appears as grantee or in any 
other document recorded in accordance with this title that sets forth the names of the 
beneficiaries, specifies the interest claimed, and describes the real property subject to 
the interest. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-3-102 
UT ST § 57-3-102 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Copr. ® 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
V\festlaw. 
UT ST § 57-4a-2 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-4a-2 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 4a. EFFECTS OF RECORDING 
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
57-4a-2 Recorded document imparts notice of contents despite defects. 
A recorded document imparts notice of its contents regardless of any defect, 
irregularity, or omission in its execution, attestation, or acknowledgment. A certified 
copy of a recorded document is admissible as evidence to the same extent the original 
document would be admissible as evidence. 
History: C. 1953, 57-4a-2, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 155, § 20. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Effect on existing documents. 
When this section took effect on July 1, 1988, it operated to cure any existing 
defective recorded document. First Sec. Bank v. Styler, 147 Bankr. 248 (D. Utah 1992). 
This section does not say that a defective document is valid only if recorded after July 
1, 1988. First Sec. Bank v. Styler, 147 Bankr. 248 (D. Utah 1992). 
Section 68-3-3, prohibiting retroactive effect unless expressly declared, has no 
application to the operation of this section. This section cured existing defective 
recorded documents when it took effect; it did not retroactively cure any defective 
instruments. First Sec. Bank v. Styler, 147 Bankr. 248 (D. Utah 1992). 
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-4a-2 
UT ST § 57-4a-2 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Wfestlaw 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 57-4a-4 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 4a. EFFECTS OF RECORDING 
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
57-4a-4 Presumptions. 
(1) A recorded document creates the following presumptions regarding title to the real 
property affected: 
(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by the person purporting to 
execute it; 
(b) the person executing the document and the person on whose behalf it is executed 
are the persons they purport to be; 
(c) the person executing the document was neither incompetent nor a minor at any 
relevant time; 
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time between dates on the document 
and the date of recording; 
(e) any necessary consideration was given; 
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created or described by the 
document acted in good faith at all relevant times; 
(g) a person executing a document as an agent, attorney in fact, officer of an 
organization, or in a fiduciary or official capacity: 
(i) held the position he purported to hold and acted within the scope of his authority; 
(ii) in the case of an officer of an organization, was authorized under all applicable 
laws to act on behalf of the organization,- and 
(iii) in the case of an agent, his agency was not revoked, and he acted for a principal 
who was neither incompetent nor a minor at any relevant time; 
(h) a person executing the document as an individual: 
(i) was unmarried on the effective date of the document; or 
(ii) if it otherwise appears from the document that the person was married on the 
effective date of the document, the grantee was a bona fide purchaser and the grantor 
received adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth so that the joinder of 
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the nonexecuting spouse was not required under Sections 75-2-201 through 75-2-207; 
(i) if the document purports to be executed pursuant to or to be a final determination 
in a judicial or administrative proceeding, or to be executed pursuant to a power of 
eminent domain, the court, official body, or condemnor acted within its jurisdiction and 
all steps required for the execution of the document were taken; and 
(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document, including without limitation 
recitals concerning mergers or name changes of organizations, are true. 
(2) The presumptions stated in Subsection (1) arise even though the document purports 
only to release a claim or to convey any right, title, or interest of the person executing 
it or the person on whose behalf it is executed. 
History: C. 1953, 57-4a-4, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 155, § 22; 1989, ch. 88, § 11. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Evidence to overcome presumption. 
Cited. 
Evidence to overcome presumption. 
The presumption of valid delivery when a deed has been executed and recorded may be 
overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that the deed was in fact not delivered. 
Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Cited in Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-4a-4 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 36. LIENS 
CHAPTER 9. WRONGFUL LIEN 
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
38-9-1 Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful property 
interest in certain real property, including an owner, title holder, mortgagee, trustee, 
or beneficial owner. 
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property who offers a 
document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a lien or 
other claim of interest in certain real property. 
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in certain real 
property. 
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful 
property interest in certain real property, including an owner, titleholder, mortgagee, 
trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and interest in that real property appears in 
the county recorder's records for the county in which the property is located. 
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in certain real 
property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records for the county in which the 
property is located. 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance 
on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is recorded or filed is 
not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real 
property. 
History. C. 1953, 38-9-1, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 125, § 2. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
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Repeals and Reenactments. --Laws 1997, ch. 125, § 2, repeals former § 38-9-1, as enacted 
by Laws 1985, ch. 182, § l, relating to the liability of a person filing a wrongful lien, 
and enacts the present section. See §§ 38-9-4 and 38-9-5 for present liability 
provisions. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Wrongful lien. 
A notice of termination of restrictive covenants recorded in the office of the county 
recorder was not a wrongful lien. Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 TJT 16, 998 P.2d 807. 
Plaintiffs were entitled to summary relief where the parties' sales agreement did not 
convey defendants an interest in property, but only a qualified promise to do so at a 
later time, and therefore defendants* notice of interest was a wrongful lien as defined in 
this section. Russell v. Thomas, 2000 UT App 82, 999 P.2d 1244. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-9-1 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 38. LIENS 
CHAPTER 9. WRONGFUL LIEN 
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
38-9-2 Scope. 
(1) (a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1, 38-9-3, 38-9-4, 38-9- 5, and 38-9-6 apply to 
any recording or filing or any rejected recording or filing of a lien pursuant to this 
chapter on or after May 5, 1997. 
(b) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-7 apply to all liens of record 
regardless of the date the lien was recorded or filed. 
(2) The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a lis pendens 
in accordance with Section 78-40-2 or seeking any other relief permitted by law. 
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who 
files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter l, Mechanics' Liens. 
History: C. 1953, 38-9-2, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 125, § 3; 1999, ch. 122, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repeals and Reenactments. --Laws 1997, ch. 125, § 3 repeals former § 38-9-2, as enacted 
by Laws 1985, ch. 182, § 2, relating to an unauthorized lien as invalid, and enacts the 
present section. For present comparable provision, see § 38-9-7. 
Amendment Notes. --The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, added the Subsection 
(1)(a) designation; substituted the list of sections in Subsection (1)(a) for "this 
chapter"; added Subsection (1)(b); and added "Mechanics' Liens" in Subsection (3). 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 38. LIENS 
CHAPTER 9. WRONGFUL LIEN 
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
38-9-3 County recorder may reject wrongful lien within scope of employment --Good faith 
requirement. 
(1) A county recorder may reject recording of a lien if the county recorder determines 
the lien is a wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-9-1. If the county recorder rejects 
the document, the county recorder shall immediately return the original document together 
with a notice that the document was rejected pursuant to this section to the person 
attempting to record or file the document or to the address provided on the document. 
(2) A county recorder who, within the scope of the county recorder's employment, rejects 
or accepts a document for recording or filing in good faith under this section may not be 
liable for damages except as otherwise provided by law. 
(3) If a rejected document is later found to be recordable pursuant to a court order, it 
shall have no retroactive recording priority. 
(4) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude any person from pursuing any remedy pursuant 
to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65A, Injunctions. 
History: C. 1953, 38-9-3, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 125, § 4. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repeals and Reenactments. --Laws 1997, ch. 125, § 4 repeals former § 38-9-3, as enacted 
by Laws 1985, ch. 182, § 3, relating to liability for refusing to correct a document 
containing a wrongful lien, and enacts the present section. 
Cross-References. --Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3- 204, 76-3-301. 
County recorder, powers and duties, § 17-21-1 et seq. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-9-3 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 38. LIENS 
CHAPTER 9. WRONGFUL LIEN 
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
38-9-4 Civil liability for filing wrongful lien --Damages. 
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder against real 
property is liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages proximately caused 
by the wrongful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) refuses to release or correct the 
wrongful lien within 20 days from the date of written request from a record interest 
holder of the real property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known address of 
the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record interest holder for $1,000 or for 
treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for treble 
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs, who 
records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in Section 
38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real property, knowing or having 
reason to know that the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim. 
History: C. 1953, 38-9-4, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 125, § 5. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repeals and Reenactments. --Laws 1997, ch. 125, § 5 repeals former § 38-9-4, as enacted 
by Laws 1985, ch. 182, § 6, relating to venue, costs, and attorney fees, and enacts the 
present section. For present provisions, see § 38-9-6. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 38. LIENS 
CHAPTER 9. WRONGFUL LIEN 
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
38-9-5 Criminal liability for filing a wrongful lien --Penalties. 
(1) A person who intentionally records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a 
wrongful lien with a county recorder is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Under this 
Subsection (1), it is an affirmative defense to this offense that the person recorded or 
filed a release of the claim or lien within 20 days from the date of written request from 
a record interest holder that the wrongful lien be released. The accused person shall 
prove this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 
(2) A person who intentionally records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a 
wrongful lien with the county recorder is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time 
of recording or filing, the person knowingly had no present, lawful property interest in 
the real property and no reasonable basis to believe he had a present, lawful property 
interest in the real property. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall bar a prosecution for any act in violation of Section 
76-8-414. 
History: C. 1953, 38-9-5, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 125, § 6. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Effective Dates. --Laws 1997, ch. 125 became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to Utah 
Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Cross-References. --Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 3 8 . LIENS 
CHAPTER 9. WRONGFUL LIEN 
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
38-9-6 Petition to file lien --Notice to record interest holders --Summary relief 
--Contested petition. 
(l) A lien claimant whose document is rejected pursuant to Section 38-9-3 may petition 
the district court in the county in which the document was rejected for an expedited 
determination that the lien may be recorded or filed. 
(2) (a) The petition shall be filed with the district court within ten days of the date 
notice is received of the rejection and shall state with specificity the grounds why the 
document should lawfully be recorded or filed. 
(b) The petition shall be supported by a sworn affidavit of the lien claimant. 
(c) If the court finds the petition is insufficient, it may dismiss the petition 
without a hearing. 
(d) If the court grants a hearing, the petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition, 
notice of hearing, and a copy of the court's order granting an expedited hearing on all 
record interest holders of the property sufficiently in advance of the hearing to enable 
any record interest holder to attend the hearing and service shall be accomplished by 
certified or registered mail. 
(e) Any record interest holder of the property has the right to attend and contest the 
petition. 
(3) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court finds that the document may lawfully 
be recorded, it shall issue an order directing the county recorder to accept the document 
for recording. If the petition is contested, the court may award costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 
(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether or not a 
contested document, on its face, shall be recorded by the county recorder. The proceeding 
may not determine the truth of the content of the document nor the property or legal 
rights of the parties beyond the necessary determination of whether or not the document 
shall be recorded. The court's grant or denial of the petition under this section may not 
restrict any other legal remedies of any party, including any right to injunctive relief 
pursuant to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65A, Injunctions. 
(5) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings may not be 
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expedited under this section. 
History: C. 1953, 38-9-6, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 125, § 7. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Effective Dates. --Laws 1997, ch. 125 became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to Utah 
Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 3 8 . LIENS 
CHAPTER 9. WRONGFUL LIEN 
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
38-9-7 Petition to nullify lien --Notice to lien claimant --Summary relief --Finding of 
wrongful lien --Wrongful lien is void. 
(1) Any record interest holder of real property against which a wrongful lien as 
defined in Section 38-9-1 has been recorded may petition the district court in the county 
in which the document was recorded for summary relief to nullify the lien. 
(2) The petition shall state with specificity the claim that the lien is a wrongful lien 
and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit of the record interest holder. 
(3) (a) If the court finds the petition insufficient, it may dismiss the petition 
without a hearing. 
(b) If the court finds the petition is sufficient, the court shall schedule a hearing 
within ten days to determine whether the document is a wrongful lien. 
(c) The record interest holder shall serve a copy of the petition on the lien claimant 
and a notice of the hearing pursuant to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4, Process. 
(d) The lien claimant is entitled to attend and contest the petition. 
(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether or not a 
document is a wrongful lien. The proceeding shall not determine any other property or 
legal rights of the parties nor restrict other legal remedies of any party. 
(5) (a) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court determines that the document is 
a wrongful lien, the court shall issue an order declaring the wrongful lien void ab 
initio, releasing the property from the lien, and awarding costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees to the petitioner. 
(b) (i) The record interest holder may record a certified copy of the order with the 
county recorder. 
(ii) The order shall contain a legal description of the real property. 
(c) If the court determines that the claim of lien is valid, the court shall dismiss 
the petition and may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the lien claimant. The 
dismissal order shall contain a legal description of the real property. The prevailing 
lien claimant may record a certified copy of the dismissal order. 
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(6) If the district court determines that the lien is a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1, the wrongful lien is void ab initio and provides no notice of claim or 
interest. 
(7) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings may not be 
expedited under this section. 
History: C. 1953, 38-9-7, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 125, § 8. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Effective Dates. --Laws 1997, ch. 125 became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to Utah 
Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Future interest. 
Plaintiffs were entitled to summary relief where the parties' sales agreement did not 
convey defendants an interest in property, but only a qualified promise to do so at a 
later time, and therefore defendants' filed notice of interest was a wrongful lien under § 
38-9-1. Russell v. Thomas, 2000 UT App 82, 999 P.2d 1244. 
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